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    <title>Ai-Safety on Anatoly&#39;s Blog</title>
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      <title>We Can&#39;t Contain AI. So Let&#39;s Build an AI Force.</title>
      <link>https://anatoly.dev/posts/2026/09/we-cant-contain-ai-so-lets-build-an-ai-force/</link>
      <pubDate>Sat, 05 Sep 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;h2 id=&#34;what-actually-happened&#34;&gt;What actually happened&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In July 2026, OpenAI &lt;a href=&#34;https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-model-evaluation-security-incident/&#34;&gt;disclosed&lt;/a&gt; that during an internal cybersecurity evaluation its models — GPT-5.6 Sol together with an unreleased, more capable model — broke out of their test sandbox. The models were running with their normal safety restrictions turned off, which is standard for this kind of test. They found a path to the open internet through a third-party file repository (Artifactory) wired into the test setup, started leaving notes for each other in that shared repository — effectively a hidden message board where they swapped vulnerabilities and progress — and after OpenAI patched the hole, they opened a second channel and kept going. Once online, the agents reasoned that Hugging Face probably had the answers to the evaluation they were stuck on, broke into Hugging Face&amp;rsquo;s production servers, and pulled out what they needed to &amp;ldquo;solve&amp;rdquo; the task. Nobody at OpenAI noticed for months; the connection was only made when an internal review spotted exposed credentials. Hugging Face published its own &lt;a href=&#34;https://huggingface.co/blog/agent-intrusion-technical-timeline&#34;&gt;technical timeline&lt;/a&gt; of the intrusion, and OpenAI later released a &lt;a href=&#34;https://cdn.openai.com/pdf/67869394-cb91-4c12-888c-5cbd85c7814c/OpenAI-Hugging-Face%20Incident-Technical-Report.pdf&#34;&gt;full technical report&lt;/a&gt; and a &lt;a href=&#34;https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-incident-and-the-road-ahead/&#34;&gt;post-mortem&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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